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The ability to commercialize innovations is central to firm survival and 
success and despite research on parts of the process, there is no overarching 
framework. Successful commercialization can include retaining ownership of 
the innovation and bringing it to market, sharing it by licensing or developing 
it with partners, or by selling it. A firm-level model is constructed that goes 
from innovation sourcing, through assessment of viability, to selection of the 
optimum form of governance. External networks and absorptive capacity 
at the meso level, plus micro- and macro-level factors, as moderators 
affecting the strength of the relationship between viability and governance 
are identified. Propositions are generated on these relationships for empirical 
testing and further theoretical insight.  
 Would an author of today find a publisher for a book that advocated the 
conservation of our natural resources because “We can see our forests vanishing, our 
innovation is a complex notion and to truly see the inherent value in it in a corporate 
setting, one must see innovation manifested in outcomes such as commercialized 
products” (Schendel & Hill, 2007). In 2008, Nokia and Sony-Ericsson each 
successfully introduced over seventy models of cellular phones, thus penetrating many 
market niches. That pace of commercialization allowed the innovators to be successful 
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with introduced products, and it raised barriers for potential competitors. Successful 
commercialization of innovations is not only of strategic importance to firms (Nerkar 
& Shane, 2007), but it is also a key driver of economic growth (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). 
Schendel and Hitt (2007) argued that economic growth is related to entrepreneurial 
activities. Entrepreneurial activities such as selection of partners, forming alliances, 
and creating subsidiaries and spinouts are often centered around the commercial 
potential of innovations and assessments of the related capabilities of firms. The ability 
to commercialize innovations can help firms penetrate existing markets or create 
new markets, which contributes to the attainment of sustained leadership and firm 
longevity, which, in turn, positively impacts the health of the economy (Salamenkaita 
& Salo, 2002; Wallsten, 2000). 
 It is therefore no surprise that governments at nearly all levels attempt to 
mitigate market and other systemic failures that act as a barrier to innovation and 
subsequent commercialization. A better understanding of the process of innovation 
commercialization is therefore important at multiple levels. It has become generally 
accepted that, on average, it takes about three thousand raw ideas to result in a 
commercially successful product (Stevens & Burley, 1997). That statistic is far worse 
in some industries such as pharmaceuticals where only one out of 10,000 compounds 
succeeds as a new product, with an overall time from discovery to market of over a 
decade and a total cost approaching $1 billion. Even worse, those statistics hide the 
fact that more products could be successful but fail because of flaws in the process of 
commercialization. Despite such a low probability to success, firms have to bring new 
products to market because the alternative is the demise of the firm.
 Firms typically depend on products developed three to five years ago for large 
portions of their current sales, which means that they are aiming three to five years 
in the future at a target that is both elusive and competitive in nature. Additionally, 
globalization of markets has put more pressure on firms to commercialize innovations 
in order to fend off global competition, to expand into global markets, or both (Collin 
& Porras, 1997; Hamel & Getz, 2004 ; Hamel & Prahalad, 2002; Huber & Glick, 
1993; Huygens et al., 2001; March, 1991). As the global environment continues to 
grow at a faster pace, innovation is a requirement for ongoing organizational survival 
and continuing success (Schendel & Hill, 2007). In addition to these global stimuli, 
there are other environmental factors, such as rapid technological development, which 
simultaneously enhance and exacerbate the need for successful commercialization. 
Advances in information technology, and greater ease of use of these technologies, have 
led to shorter cycle times in developing new technology applications. These changes 
have resulted in greater process improvements and more efficient generation of new 
products and product changes (Brynjolfsson & Mendelson, 1993; Gulati, Sawhney 
& Paoni, 2002), which has further increased the speed with which firms and their 
competitors need to innovate and commercialize. Clearly, innovation and subsequent 
commercialization both are important, but where the former has received substantial 
attention in the literature (Damanpour, 1991; Dougerty & Hardy, 1996; McGrath et al., 
1996; Pennings & Harianto, 1992; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), the latter has not, 
some seminal pieces notwithstanding (Andrew & Sirkin, 2003; Kelm, Narayanan & 
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Pinches, 1995; Kwak, 2002; Narayanan et al., 2000; Nerkar & Shane, 2007). Thus, the 
research question is posed: What are the determinants of success in commercialization of 
innovations?  In order to address this question, we explore the related questions of a) 
what resources and capabilities are necessary to innovate and commercialize, and b) what 
forms of governance help to maximize returns from innovation commercialization?
 To answer these questions, a review of the literature on innovation and 
commercialization is made. Then a baseline model of the innovation-commercialization 
process that starts with sourcing of innovations is built, followed by an assessment of 
viability, and finish with selection of the best governance form. The foundation for 
this baseline model came from Schendel and Hitt’s (2007) contention that sources of 
innovation are complex and multiple, and the value potential is difficult to assess. It 
can be assusmed that the firm has the necessary motivation to innovate. The study also 
adopts the view that innovation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful 
commercialization. Having innovated and found it to be viable not only legally, but also 
in terms of profitability and access to the necessary capabilities for commercialization, 
we then address the thesis that success in the ability to commercialize is contained 
within selection of one of three forms of governance: own, partner, or sell. The strength 
of the relationship between viability and governance is affected by four moderators, 
two of which are firm level (external networks and absorptive capacity), one of which 
is a micro-level factor (previous managerial experience), and one of which is a macro-
level factor (dynamism, munificence, and complexity in the operating environment). 
To ease the process of identifying these main and moderating effects, this paper 
assumes that there is demand for the innovation. It is also assumed that success in 
commercialization arises from a rational and managed process, and that luck is not 
counted upon as a factor input. Finally, the discussion is bound by limiting ourselves to 
established firms that have cash flows or access to any needed capital that allows them 
to make the expenditures that are necessary for commercialization.
Prior Research
 The innovation process is defined as the combined activities leading to new, 
marketable products and services, or new product-delivery systems (Burgelman, 
Christensen & Wheelright, 2006), and a firm’s ability to innovate is dependent upon 
its capabilities (Damanpour, 1991; Dougerty & Hardy, 1996; McGrath et al., 1996; 
Pennings & Harianto, 1992; Teece et al., 1997), its human resource practices (Nerkar, 
McGrath & MacMillan, 1996; Scott & Bruce, 1994), the nature of the top management 
team (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Howell & Higgins, 1990), and the external environment 
within which the firm operates (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Keats & Hitt, 1988; 
Milliken, 1987; Wade, 1996). Other seminal work on innovation has concentrated 
on the types of innovations: product versus process innovations (Burgelman et al., 
2006; Cooper, 1985; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Danneels, 2002; Dougerty & 
Hardy, 1996; Herstatt & Von Hippel, 1992; Schilling, 2006); radical versus incremental 
innovations (Burgelman et al., 2006; Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Golder, Shacham & Mitra, 
2008; Majchrzak, Cooper & Neece, 2004; Schilling, 2006); competence enhancing 
versus competence destroying innovations (Burgelman et al., 2006; Schilling, 2006); 
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architectural versus component innovations (Christensen, 1992a; Christensen, 1992b; 
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Wade, 1996).
 Much of the literature just cited however, has treated innovation and its 
commercialization as the same construct. In fact, commercialization in many cases 
was assumed. While innovation characteristics are a necessary component of future 
market success, innovation itself is not sufficient enough to ensure that success. 
Instead, innovations generally lead to market success through the process of 
commercialization (Drucker, 1985). While this growing body of work undoubtedly 
contributes to our understanding of successful commercialization, it remains that a 
dedicated model of the factors affecting commercialization is needed. That being said, 
a few scholars have kept innovation and commercialization as separate and distinct 
constructs. Commercialization of innovation has been defined as the act or activities 
required for introducing an innovation to market (Andrew & Sirkin, 2003; Kelm et al., 
1995; Kwak, 2002; Narayanan et al., 2000; Nerkar & Shane, 2007). Nerkar & Shane 
(2007) operationalized commercialization as the first sale of a given product or service. 
However, when an innovation is introduced in the market, only technology enthusiasts 
adopt it initially, and such enthusiasts comprise less than three percent of the market 
(Moore, 1991, 2000). The larger mainstream market is comprised of pragmatists and 
conservatives, so it can be argued that a successful commercialization is one that also 
captures this mainstream market. Fully capturing the mainstream market is difficult, 
therefore the threshold for ‘successful’ commercialization of an innovation will lie 
somewhere between these two extremes—a single sale on the one hand and saturating 
the mainstream of a market on the other (Moore, 1991, 2000). 
 New Product Development (NPD) has emerged in the literature as a complementary 
dimension of commercialization of innovations and includes the selection of projects 
for new product development (Cooper, 1985; Hansen, 1999; Herstatt & Von Hippel, 
1992). The extant literature includes investigation into processes of NPD (Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1986; Hansen, 1999; Herstatt & Von Hippel, 1992; Johne & Snelson, 
1989; Spivey, Munson & Wolcottl, 1997; Zirger & Maidique, 1990), the effects of path 
dependency and leveraging of primary and second-order competencies (Danneels, 
2002), identifying suppliers for NPD (Ragatz, Handfield & Scannell, 1997), predicting 
success of NPD based on the type of idea and the circumstances of its emergence 
(Goldenberg, Lehmann & Mazursky, 2001), and the role of network alliances in 
information acquisition and its lagged effect on the new-product performance of 
the firm (Soh, 2003). As a body of work, this research assumes, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that the developed product does not violate existing intellectual property 
rights, it will serve a viable market, and that the firm has the wherewithal to bring 
the product to market either by itself (hierarchy) or with partners (alliances). Here, 
those assumptions make explicit in a baseline model which then becomes the vehicle 
for identifying the effect of other moderating factors that contribute to success in 
commercialization.
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Baseline Model
The baseline model is comprised of three constructs: innovation sourcing, viability and 
potential, and governance form. Sources of innovation can be internal or external to the 
firm, and strategies to manage those sources are deliberate and emergent. Viability and 
potential looks at the legal feasibility and profit potential of the innovation. Viability 
and potential are linked with three forms governance: own, partner, or sell. Figure 1 
depicts the constructs are linked and their relationships.
Figure 1:  Baseline Model
Innovation Sourcing
 Whereas the innovation process is defined as the combined activities that lead to 
new, marketable products (Burgleman et al., 2006), innovation itself is defined as the 
practical implementation of an idea into a new product (Markham, 2000; Schilling, 
2006). As such, innovation sourcing means being aware of the disparate sources of 
ideas and being willing and able to use them.
 Sources of ideas for innovations can be internal or external to the firm. The internal 
generation of ideas arises from organizational creativity, which can range from being 
a one-off organizational aberration, to a formalized process that is embedded in the 
culture or supported as a separate R&D function. The creativity of the organization is 
a function of the creativity of individuals, social processes, and contextual factors that 
shape the way individuals interact and behave (Woodman, Sawyer & Griffin, 1993). 
Firm R&D intensity has been shown to have a positive correlation with sales from new 
products, sales growth rate, and profitability (Roberts, 2001; Schilling, 2006). Thus, 
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as a source of ideas for innovation, the R&D function, whether internally funded or 
externally contracted, is key (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Iwasa & Odagiri, 2004; Katila, 2002; Kelm et al., 1995; Kortum 
& Lerner, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Levin, 1988; Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005; 
Veugelers, 1997; Wallsten, 2000). It also is a readily apparent source and, as such, does 
not need further elaboration aside from noting that it is the norm to have processes in 
place for moving ideas forward for assessment for commercialization. 
 Discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities is somewhat probabilistic in nature, 
as opposed to the result of a systematic search effort (Kirzner, 1997). Entrepreneurs 
seem best able to “discover” opportunities for commercialization that directly relate 
to their previous knowledge of markets, knowledge of how to serve those markets, 
and knowledge of specific customer problems (Shane, 2000). This knowledge is not 
equally distributed across all entrepreneurs and therefore, is necessarily a function of 
their relationships with innovators, and funders (Anderson, 2008). Thus, recognition 
of an opportunity to commercialize an innovation is more likely to happen within 
a network of these entities (Seppanen & Skates, 2001) through knowledge sharing 
and transfer. 
 Networks with customers, suppliers, complementors, and competitors also are 
valuable sources of new product ideas (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986; Yoon & Lilien, 
1988). External sources of information also complement in-house R&D by increasing 
a firm’s absorptive capacity (Chen, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998; Zahra & George, 2002). These sources include new ventures, licensing 
arrangements, sourcing agreements, research associations, and government-sponsored, 
joint research programs for technical and scientific interchange, as well as informal 
networks (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Allen, 1977; Burt, 1992; Freeman, 1991; Hargadon 
& Sutton, 1997, 2000). Such networks are especially important in high-technology 
sectors where it is unlikely that an individual firm will possess all the capabilities 
necessary to develop a significant innovation (Hagedoorn, 2002). Additionally, 
technology spillovers, which are defined as a positive externality from R&D resulting 
from the spread of knowledge across organization and regional boundaries (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Schilling, 2006), also provide ideas for innovation. Technology 
spillovers not only have a significant influence on innovation activities (Henderson, 
Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1998; Jaffe, 1986; Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993), they also 
increase a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Strategies to Manage Sources of Ideas: Deliberate and Emergent
 Strategy has been distinguished as deliberate and emergent (Bodwell & Chermack, 
2009; Fuller-Love & Cooper, 2000; Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 
1998; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). While deliberate strategies tend to emphasize 
central direction and hierarchy, emergent ones open the way for collective action 
and convergent behavior (Bodwell & Chermack, 2009; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
Deliberate strategy is the specification of intended actions the firm plans to take to 
achieve its goals, whereas emergent strategy happens when companies engage in actions 
that evolve unplanned from past patterns or newly recognized patterns in the business 
environment (Bodwell & Chermack, 2009). Few strategies are purely deliberate or 
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purely emergent (Mintzberg et al., 1998). One means no learning, the other means no 
control. As Mintzberg et al. (1998) argued, all real-world strategies need to mix these in 
some way, which means exercising control while fostering learning. That means being 
willing to use (or combine) ideas from R&D (deliberate) along with those that arise 
from other sources of organizational creativity (emergent), or those from collaborations 
(deliberate), along with those from networks and spillovers (emergent). Thus,
Proposition 1: Firms that have processes in place for monitoring both internal and 
external sources and deliberate and emergent sources of ideas for innovation will 
capture more ideas than those that rely on single sources.
Viability
 The viability and potential of an innovation for development and commercialization 
is determined through a series of legal searches and business decisions. A legal search 
is required to determine whether or not the innovation infringes upon existing 
patents and if so, whether or not those patents can be challenged. The business part 
of the process is a series of decisions ranging from the tactical, such as whether to 
kill an innovation project or support it, to the strategic, with the latter depending on 
assessments of the potential market, barriers to entry into that market, fit with existing 
products and service platforms, trends in the industry, externalities and installed base, 
and the availability of complements. These issues are well described by Schilling (1998) 
and do not need further discussion here. Instead, we simply assume that the strategy 
of commercialization is viable and that the firm can profit in one way or another from 
that commercialization. 
 It was Schumpeter (1934) who originally noted that because innovations can be 
protected from imitation, they can provide superior returns. Those superior returns 
generally are considered in terms of economic rents (Schumpeter, 1934). They can 
occur in the form of monopoly rents, which arise from barriers to competition and 
barriers to entry that prohibit existing and potential competitors from satisfying excess 
demand. They can occur in the form of Ricardian rents, which arise from owning 
scarce resources that permit development of the innovation. They can also occur in the 
form of entrepreneurial rents, which are received by bringing to market a new product 
or service. The latter are naturally self-destructive because, with patenting or bringing 
to market a new product or service, the underlying knowledge is revealed (Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992).
 Instead of earning rents from commercialization, there may be private benefits from 
bringing an innovation to market, such as when it is a complementary product or service 
that supports other existing activities. Thus, an innovation may be commercialized 
even if it loses money, as long as the combined public and private returns are positive. 
Any discussion of rents implies supernormal profits, but it long has been argued that 
all that is needed to induce an entrepreneur to bring an innovation to market is the 
guarantee of an irreducible minimum amount of profit (Marshall, 1967), such as that 
which can be found be investing in zero-risk government securities. Extending that 
thinking to managers in firms,
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Proposition 2: In the absence of the potential for economic rents or private benefits, 
firms will still be willing to commercialize innovations that have positive but low 
levels of return.
Governance 
 Governance deals with the form of structure required for commercialization. 
Essentially, it is a choice among three options: ownership of the technology with its 
development and commercialization being in-house, commercializing the innovation 
with others either through an alliance or via licensing, or selling it for others to 
commercialize. Usually, commercialization is thought of in terms of the first two forms, 
but electing to sell an innovation also allows the firm to secure a return and arguably is 
also a form of commercialization. The choice of which form to adopt is governed by: (a) 
the amount of profit available from commercialization, and (b) the distance between 
a firm’s existing capabilities and those required for it to be able to commercialize the 
innovation. In the following discussion, we build on Teece’s (1986) contention that 
regimes of appropriability must be in place and on the thesis that economic gain rests 
critically upon a firm’s ability to create and transfer technology more quickly than it is 
imitated in the market.
 When the returns from an innovation are high and the firm already has the 
requisite capabilities to build the assets that are required for commercialization then, 
logically, development will be through hierarchy (in-house). If the capabilities are 
not available internally, then sourcing them externally will reduce the firm’s ability 
to earn rents from the innovation because suppliers of those resources will bid up 
prices, or they may turn into potential competitors. An alternative is to develop 
the capabilities internally. That requires an assessment of the effects on the current 
stock of knowledge and capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996) because long-
term strategies of building new capabilities can require a tradeoff between current 
and future profitability. Such a choice is viable only when the firm’s survival is not at 
stake and it has the necessary short-term cash flows to undertake learning initiatives 
and bear the associated risks (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 
1996). Conversely, too much reliance on exploiting current profitability may deter 
a firm from developing capabilities for the future (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Stiglitz, 
1987). The decision of maintaining and developing some capabilities over others is 
influenced by the current knowledge of the firm and expectations from economic 
gain by exploring newer technologies and organizing principles into future market 
developments (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, the promise of economic rents is 
usually sufficient to convince firms that developing new capabilities is a worthwhile 
activity (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996). The most significant 
determinant of ‘make’ or ‘buy’ and ‘within firm’ or ‘with suppliers’ has been found to 
be the transaction costs associated with relying on outside suppliers (Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1984). It has been shown that 
volume and technological uncertainties, and the production capability of the buyer, 
reduce the advantage of buy over make, while supplier production cost advantage, 
competitiveness of a supplier market, and the size of supplier market increases the 
advantage of ‘buy’ over ‘make’ (Walker & Weber, 1984). While boundaries of firms are 
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influenced by transaction costs (Williamson, 1981, 1991, 2000), performance relies 
mostly on owned capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
 An innovation can be contracted, licensed, or developed with alliances when the 
firm does not have the necessary capabilities required to bring it to market, when there 
are uncertain cash flows, and when imitators and competitors are better positioned 
(Teece, 1986). Specifically, when an innovation has the potential to earn high returns, 
but the firm does not have the capabilities to develop the assets necessary for bringing 
the innovation to market, the available options are to develop the innovation with 
partners or license it out (Friedman, 2006). It also means that when the firm has the 
requisite capabilities to develop the assets that are critical for commercialization but the 
innovation only has the potential for low returns, commercialization via partnership is 
also preferable. Choosing between alliances for joint development or licensing depends 
upon several factors beyond profit potential and capabilities. For example, the short-
term profitability needs of the firm and high investment costs (Kalaignanam, Shankar 
& Varadarajan, 2007; Makadok & Walker, 2000; Zahra, 1996), along with the existence 
of steep learning curves (Malerba, 1992), make a strong case for licensing. Additionally, 
licensing an innovation is an option when the licensor has superior, tacit knowledge that 
protects the ability to secure rents, when capabilities required for commercialization 
are beyond those possessed by the firm, or there is pressure for immediate survival. 
In the case of the lack of capabilities, if the innovating firm does not license its new 
technology, competitors may quickly develop their own, possibly better, versions of 
the technology. By licensing the technology, the innovating firm may ensure that its 
version of the technology becomes the dominant design in an industry advantage (Hill, 
1992; Schilling, 1998; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Advantages of partnerships include 
sharing costs and risks of development, combining complementary skills and resources 
(Ahuja, 2000b; Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Brass, Galaskiewicz & Greve, 2004; Freeman, 
1991; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007), enabling 
transfer of knowledge between firms (Cowan & Jonard, 2004; Freeman, 1991; Gulati, 
Nohria & Zaheer, 2000), and facilitation of creation of shared standards (Brass et al., 
2004; Gulati, 1995, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1996; Provan et al., 
2007). A clear example of these advantages is in the commercialization of Microsoft’s 
Windows software. Developing complementary assets needed for commercialization 
of the software required sets of capabilities that were distant from what Microsoft 
possessed, but the partnership with Intel resulted in the emergence of the industry 
standard Wintel and a success for both firms.
 Going back to the transaction-cost economics (Williamson, 1981, 1983, 1991, 
1994, 1998), contracts with partners in developing an innovation may lead to a 
reduction of uncertainty at the cost of opportunism. Such behavior occurs when 
an innovation, albeit novel, has uncertain market potential, or requires capabilities 
beyond those of the firm. A governance structure that leads to reduction of uncertainty 
in this scenario is more important than a partner being opportunistic. Mutual gains 
from contracts and alliances will be a less risky form of governance than in-house 
development. Such was the case for Microsoft.
 Lastly, when the potential to earn profits is low and the capabilities needed to 
develop assets required to commercialize the innovation are not available internally or 
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through partnerships, the most logical option is to sell the innovation to another firm. 
Given this low-returns scenario, this would be the least risky option. That, of course, 
assumes that the sale would not result in the buyer becoming a future competitor. 
Thus,
Proposition 3a: An innovation with low profit potential, combined with the lack 
of capabilities necessary for developing the assets required for commercialization, 
will result in selling the innovation. 
Proposition 3b: Firms will mitigate the risk of commercialization via alliances or 
licensing when an innovation has low profit-potential even though the capabilities 
for commercialization are present, or when the innovation has high profit-potential 
but the capabilities are not present. 
Proposition 3c: An innovation with high profit potential, combined 
with the capabilities necessary for developing the assets required for 
commercialization, will result in retained ownership of the innovation and in-
house commercialization. 
The base line model along with the moderators was depicted in Figure 1. 
Moderators
The effect of the moderators on Proposition 3 is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Figure 2:  Model of Factors Affecting Governance of Innovation Commercialization
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Figure 3:  Effect of moderators on Governance
Firm-level Moderators
 Networks. Social, external, and internal networks are considered three different 
network types that focus on different levels of analysis, use different theoretical 
constructs, and explain different outcomes (Van Wijk, 2003). For the purpose of 
discussion, networks external to the firm and those which extend its boundaries will 
be the focus. External network research focuses on networks as a governance mode 
intermediating markets and hierarchies—e.g., joint-ventures and strategic alliances. It 
highlights the competitive dimension of networks and, therefore, focuses particularly on 
performance issues (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The terms ‘external’ or ‘interorganizational’ 
network are used interchangeably with strategic alliances, coalitions, and cooperative 
arrangements (Provan et al., 2007), and have been tied to resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991), and 
interorganizational contracts (Ariño & Reuer, 2006). Despite these differences, all 
definitions of external networks refer to common themes including social interaction, 
relationships, connectedness, collaboration, collective action, trust, and cooperation 
(Provan et al., 2007).
 Organizations enter alliances with each other to access critical resources, 
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knowledge, and capabilities, but they rely on information from the network of prior 
alliances to determine with whom to cooperate (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). These new 
alliances modify the existing network, prompting an endogenous dynamic between 
organizational action and network structure that drives the emergence of external 
networks. While networks are formed to access and share resources (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Gnyawali, He & Madhvan, 2006; Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Kletter, 2005; Gulati 
et al., 2000; Klein, Rai & Straub, 2007b; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), they themselves 
become valuable resources, enabling a firm to access and possibly increase its stock 
of knowledge and capabilities beyond its boundaries (Barney, 1991; Mata, Fuerst & 
Barney, 1995; Melville, Kraemer & Gurbaxani, 2004; Porter, 1980; Ray, Muhanna & 
Barney, 2005). The characteristics of an organization’s network of external relations 
are relevant to a firm’s ability to commercialize innovations (Nohria, 1992; Nohria 
& Eccles, 1992). Networks can be defined as the collective of structures and 
collaborations between organizations. From an external-network standpoint, this 
includes social networks, business clusters, partnerships, business ecosystems, and 
relationships with innovation engines. To better understand the impact of networks on 
the commercialization process, the concepts of centrality and multiplexity in networks 
need to be considered. 
 Centrality determines the relative importance of an entity or a node within a 
network. While some organizations will struggle to reach the central position on any 
network to maintain competitive advantage and control key resources and capabilities, 
others may instead link themselves to the central node (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gnyawali 
et al., 2006; Gulati, 1995, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati & Kletter, 2005; 
Gulati et al., 2000; Klein, Rai & Straub, 2007a). Being in a central position or having a 
direct link to the central node within an external network, firms are better able to access 
resources and capabilities, such as finance, manufacturing facilities, or distribution 
channels that help in the commercialization of innovations (Gnyawali et al., 2006; 
Klein et al., 2007a). 
 Multiplexity deals with the strength of the relationship an organization maintains 
with network partners, based on the number of types of links (e.g., research ties, 
joint programs, referrals, and shared personnel) connecting them (Provan et al., 
2007). Multiplexity is also referred to as a heterogeneity of networks (Newman, 
2001). Multiplex ties are thought to be an indicator of the strength and durability of 
an organization’s links because they enable the connection between an organization 
and its linkage partner to be sustained even if one type of link dissolves (Provan 
et al., 2007). Two entities that have collaborated in multiple arrangements such as 
manufacturing and marketing or the exchange of unique information, are likely to 
know each other better, on average, than those that have had fewer such collaborations. 
These interactions add value to the network, enabling the exchange of knowledge and 
capabilities required to succeed in the commercialization of innovations. 
 External networks can also include ties with universities, national research 
laboratories, and other research institutes that conduct basic research and are 
regarded as engines of innovation (Agarwal, 2006; Chataway & Wield, 2000; Colyvas 
et al., 2002; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Henderson et al., 1998; Henderson & 
Clark, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993; Numprasertchai & Igel, 2005). It constitutes a type 
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of multiplex tie that we mentioned earlier. Knowledge exchange between firms and 
innovation engines occurs through formal and informal mechanisms such as scientific 
meetings, licenses, joint ventures, research contracts, consulting, personal networks, 
research grants, recruitment of students, email, shared databases, workshops, and 
communities of practice (Cohen, Kamienski & Espino, 1998; Cohen et al., 1998; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2002; Hoegl & Schulze, 2005; 
Oliver, 2004; Powell, 1998; Rothaermel & Thursby, 2005; Salman & Saives, 2005; Van 
den Bosch, Volberda & Boer, 1999). Through contracted and funded research, both the 
innovator and the commercializer benefit and the innovation/commercialization cycle 
appears to crystallize faster and more effectively (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004). Such 
relationships help shorten the innovation cycle and promote faster commercialization, 
giving the innovator access to the firm’s capabilities and also leading to the firm gaining 
knowledge about a new technology or innovation. 
 In our previous section on governance, it was already mentioned that advantages of 
partnerships include sharing costs and risks of development, combining complementary 
skills and resources, enabling transfer of knowledge between firms, and the creation 
of shared standards. Further, choosing between alliances for joint development or 
licensing depends upon several factors including profit potential and capabilities. The 
decision to collaborate with networks to bring an innovation to market is therefore 
multidimensional. The factors include: (a) whether the firm or the collaborator has the 
required capabilities, (b) the degree to which collaborations would make proprietary 
technologies vulnerable to expropriation by a potential competitor, (c) the importance 
a firm plays in controlling the development process for its innovations, and (d) the 
role of development projects in building the firm’s own capabilities or permitting it to 
access another firm’s capabilities (Ahuja, 2000a; Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996). 
 Centrality and multiplexity in external networks moderate the relationship 
between viability and governance by extending firm boundaries. Firstly, for innovations 
with low profit potential, networks facilitate easier disposition of the technology to 
potential buyers. Knowledge of network partners and their specific needs allows the 
disposing firm to more quickly find a customer for the technology. Additionally, that 
knowledge may lead to a better fit between the innovation and the customer’s needs, 
which could, in turn, lead to increased funds from the sale. Networks thus have a 
positive effect on disposition as a form of governance. Secondly, and as discussed, 
networks aid in accessing capabilities that are essential for commercialization, such 
as those in manufacturing, or marketing and distribution. That access can come either 
in the form of licensing or alliances and as noted earlier, it depends upon the need 
to lock out competitors or to establish a dominant design. An additional potential 
benefit though is that by licensing or forming alliances to bring the innovation to 
market, firms that may have been natural competitors can effectively be removed from 
the equation. 
 When a firm has an innovation with high profit potential, plus the necessary 
capabilities for commercialization of the product, the concern is with protecting 
proprietary knowhow and controlling the development process to secure any available 
rents. Those requirements and that outcome are best achieved by keeping all activities 
in-house rather than working with partners. Networks, however, have a negative 
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impact on the selection of that form of governance. Firms centrally located in the 
networks will have access to resources from other firms and will therefore be more 
likely to develop innovations with partners. Being central in a network will enable 
the firm to have higher bargaining power which should not be compromised even 
when a critical capability required for commercialization is developed outside the firm 
boundary. Hence, centrality resists suppliers from becoming potential competitors so 
that firms can enjoy sourcing capabilities from other firms. Firms that are not central 
in the network will also tend to either license or codevelop innovations (with high 
profit potential) with partners, because being in the network will enable them to access 
critical resources, capabilities, and knowledge that would otherwise be expensive to 
develop. Overall, easier access to complementary resources offsets the advantages of 
in-house commercialization of innovations. Thus,
Proposition 4a: External network relationships have a positive moderating effect 
on decisions to sell an innovation.
Proposition 4b: External network relationships have a positive moderating effect 
on decisions to license or develop an innovation with partners.
Proposition 4c: External network relationships have a negative moderating effect 
on decisions to use in-house commercialization.
 Absorptive capacity. According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Jansen, Vanden 
Bosch and Volberda (2005), absorptive capacity is the limit to the quantity and rate 
at which a firm can absorb scientific or technological information. Conceptually, 
absorptive capacity is similar to information-processing capacity but at the firm level 
rather than at the individual level. Absorptive capacity enables firms to predict the 
commercial potential of technological advances more accurately (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). It is inherent within a firm’s knowledge capabilities by which it acquires, 
assimilates, transforms, and exploits knowledge resources to produce capabilities such 
as innovativeness (Zahra & George, 2002), and a firm’s investment in prior experience 
can increase its rate of future learning by building its absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002).
 Zahra and George (2002) deconstructed absorptive capacity into potential and 
realized absorptive capacities. Potential absorptive capacity, which includes knowledge 
acquisition and assimilation, captures efforts expended in identifying and acquiring 
new external knowledge and in assimilating knowledge obtained from external sources 
(Zahra & George, 2002). Realized absorptive capacity, which includes knowledge 
transformation and exploitation, encompasses deriving new insights and consequences 
from the combination of existing and newly acquired knowledge, and incorporating 
transformed knowledge into operations (Zahra & George, 2002). Realized absorptive 
capacity converts knowledge into products, services, and technologies (Jansen et 
al., 2005). Through the combination of potential and realized absorptive capacity, 
firms increase the distinctiveness of their innovations (Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 
2001) and are able to develop new innovations that differ substantially from existing 
Datta, Reed and Jessup 45
products, services, and processes and, all else being equal, should have the potential for 
generating higher income. In turn, that means that absorptive capacity should therefore 
have a positive moderating effect on in-house commercialization and a negative effect 
on the other forms of governance.
 In addition to absorbing and capitalizing on external scientific and technological 
information, absorptive capacity also means being able to identify and build on 
internally generated information. In other words, learning from and capitalizing on 
prior experience, which in turn, shapes the ability to recognize the value of new 
information and use it effectively. A firm’s experimentation with innovations increases 
its knowledge and experience with the technology, and also its understanding of 
market potential, which leads to better gauging of the profit potential of innovations. 
Additionally, it helps in developing new innovations, which can help firms stay ahead 
of competitors. In resource-based theory terms, previous experience is a valuable and 
difficult-to-imitate resource that provides firms with an advantage. Firms that don’t 
build on such experience effectively are starting anew with the process of bringing 
each new innovation to market and thus, they are at the bottom of the learning curve 
and unable to capitalize on cost-reducing, experience-curve effects. Further, prior 
experience will lead firms to identify complementary innovations that will add value 
to the innovation to make it more attractive. Thus, absorptive capacity has a positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between viability and governance leading to 
ownership of innovations,
Proposition 5a: Absorptive capacity has a negative moderating effect on decisions 
to sell an innovation.
Proposition 5b: Absorptive capacity has a negative moderating effect on decisions 
to license or develop an innovation with partners.
Proposition 5c: Absorptive capacity has a positive moderating effect on decisions 
to use in-house commercialization.
Micro- and Macro-level Factors
 Thus far, our arguments have focused on the role of the firm and firm-level factors 
in innovation commercialization. As such it is a meso-level model. There are, however, 
factors at both the micro and macro levels that affect success in commercialization and 
thus need addressing. 
 Micro level. At the micro level, the previous experience of managers in bringing 
an innovation to market will affect their actions with subsequent commercializations. 
Prospect theory, which explains decision making involving uncertainty in the context 
of psychology and economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), provides a useful means 
of assessing the effect of this micro-level variable on the selection of form of governance 
for commercialization. The theory offers insights into why managers make non-
optimizing decisions rather than strictly choosing those that are profit maximizing. 
The most distinctive implication of the theory is the effect that previous performance 
has on managerial attitudes towards risk. If previous firm performance is acceptable, 
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then managers will avoid risk-laden situations, even if the associated returns are high. 
However, if previous firm performance is below target, they will be more likely to 
accept more risk for higher returns. That relationship, however, is moderated by the 
framing that previous experience provides. If managers have been successful with such 
actions in the past, their assessment of the probability of failure will be artificially 
low. If they have failed in the past, it will be artificially high. Holding previous firm-
performance constant, successful previous experience with a hierarchy solution to 
commercialization would again push them towards hierarchy. Similarly, if in the past a 
firm did not have the necessary capabilities to commercialize a product, but managers 
successfully developed them, they would be more likely to underestimate the risk of 
doing so again. A poor experience would push them away from hierarchy. The same 
logic applies to previous experiences with selling an innovation or partnering to bring 
it to market.
 Obviously, Prospect theory is temporal in nature, whether previous performance 
has met target performance or not, and what managers do today is affected by what has 
happened in the past. Thus,
Proposition 6a: If firm performance is below target, then the probability of selling 
is reduced in favor of partnering or hierarchy, and the probability of partnering is 
reduced in favor of hierarchy.
Proposition 6b: If firm performance is above target, then the probability of 
hierarchy is reduced in favor of partnering (unless that form of governance has 
been successful in the past), and the probability of partnering is reduced in favor of 
selling (unless that form of governance has been successful in the past).
 Macro level. For the macro-level, the established environmental constructs of 
dynamism, munificence, and complexity is drawn on. Environmental dynamism 
results in uncertainty and unpredictability in the external environment (Child, 1972; 
Dess & Beard, 1984). Firms faced with more stable environments tend to emphasize 
static efficiency at the expense of dynamic efficiency, and this process is reversed when 
firms find themselves in unstable environments (Ghemawat & Costa, 1993). In other 
words, a firm tends to be inward-looking during stable times and outward-looking 
during disruptions. In highly dynamic environments, there is rapid and discontinuous 
change in demand, competitors, technology, and regulations. As a result, information 
is often inaccurate, unavailable, or obsolete (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Simsek, 
2009). Therefore, dynamic environments require that the organization develops 
adaptive responses quickly and expands the scope of information acquisition and 
gathering (Sidhu, Volberda & Commandeur, 2004; Simsek, 2009). In doing so, 
dynamism imposes a challenge to the organization by demanding flexibility and agile 
actions ranging from information scanning, selection, and processing to interpretation 
(Miller & Friesen, 1983; Simsek, 2009), and that strains an organization’s information-
processing capability (Simsek, 2009). Such problems can cripple an organization’s 
ability to correctly assess the profit potential of an innovation. Therefore, environmental 
dynamism has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between viability and 
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governance such that there is a reduced tendency to use an in-house approach to 
commercialization. The corollary to that is that dynamism will positively affect the 
relationship between viability and governance that leads to selling an innovation and 
licensing or developing it with partnerships. Even if the firm currently posseses what 
it considers to be the capabilities required for successful commercialization, a dynamic 
environment may make them useless or irrelevant in the future. Thus, licensing or 
development with partners remains the lower-risk option. All else being equal, such as 
prospect theory considerations, then managers will likely choose to avoid, rather than 
incur risk. 
 An environment is said to be munificent to the extent that it supports a firm’s 
continued and sustained growth, and thus refers to the extent to which critical 
resources exist in the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984). The degree of resource 
abundance in the firm’s environment (i.e., munificence) has a significant impact on the 
firm’s entrepreneurial orientation and subsequent growth (Castrogiovanni, 1991), as 
well as its ability to overcome capability weaknesses (Sirmon et al., 2010). Thus, in a 
munificent environment, a firm is more likely to take ownership of a venture (Tyebjee 
& Bruno, 1984). When the environment is munificent, that is, there are resources 
for growth, demand is present and the profit potential is high, not being able to own 
the technology and develop it in-house sacrifices income. When the environment 
offers opportunities and resources for growth, developing capabilities that may be 
distant from its current ones, but which are required for commercialization, becomes 
a more attractive option than in an environment that does not offer the same income 
opportunities. Thus, munificence has a positive moderating effect on the relationship 
between viability and governance leading to ownership, whereas the relationship 
leading to licensing or development with partnership or selling the innovation is 
affected negatively. 
 Environmental complexity is defined as the heterogeneity and concentration of 
environmental elements (Dess & Beard, 1984). A highly-complex environment is 
characterized by the level of heterogeneity of firms within the industry, a diverse range 
and high number of suppliers and customers, and a wide range of products being 
offered (Dess & Beard, 1984). A complex environment will be perceived as requiring 
more information processing than a simple environment and thus be less predictable 
(Dess & Beard, 1984; Simsek, 2009). Complex environments do not diminish an 
organization’s ability to act, but make it difficult to identify what is most appropriate 
(Boisot & Child, 1999). Under this scenario, reduction of uncertainty becomes an 
important criterion, and that can be achieved either by licensing the innovation or 
developing it with partners. Similarly, the uncertainty created by complexity also will 
likely result in more selling of innovations. Thus, complexity has a positive moderating 
effect on the relationships between viability and governance leading to selling the 
innovation, licensing the innovation or developing with partners, and a negative 
moderating effect on in-house commercialization. Therefore,
Proposition 7a. Environmental dynamism has a negative moderating effect on the 
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy, but a positive 
effect on partnering or selling the innovation. 
 Journal of Business and Management – Vol. 18, No. 1, 201248
Proposition 7b. Environmental munificence has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy, but a negative 
effect on partnering or selling the innovation.
Proposition 7c. Environmental complexity has a negative moderating effect on the 
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy, but a positive 
effect on partnering or selling the innovation.
Discussion
 Commercialization of innovation is a critical entrepreneurial activity that leads to 
economic growth, but is not yet fully understood.  A model has been constructed that 
explains how firms go from idea generation to innovation commercialization. When 
an idea emerges, then its viability has to be assessed before the process moves on to 
commercialization. This baseline framework constitutes a mid-level process model. 
Underpinning the core of the model is the argument that success in commercialization 
is derived from selecting the governance form that allows the firm to secure returns 
from an innovation while mitigating unnecessary risk. That is achieved by retaining 
ownership of the technology, licensing it to or developing it with partners, or selling it. 
Which of the three forms of governance should be selected is determined by the profit 
potential of the innovation and the current capabilities of the firm. Profit potential is 
part of the determination of the viability of an innovation and rests on the assumption 
that the technological and legal mechanisms that govern innovators’ ability to 
earn rents from innovation are in place (Teece, 1986). An innovation is sold before 
developing it into a finished good when the profit potential from the innovation is low 
and ownership of or access to capabilities that are required for commercialization are 
distant. If one of the two main conditions of profit potential or capabilities is in place, 
the innovation is either licensed or developed with partners. If, however, the profit 
potential is high and the firm has the capabilities required to develop the innovation 
and take it to market, the firm will retain ownership of the innovation and governance 
will be hierarchical. 
 Four moderators were identified that affect the strength of the relationship between 
viability and governance. First of those moderators was external networks, which had 
a negative effect on the likelihood of a firm commercializing the innovation in-house, 
and a positive effect on selling the innovation or licensing or developing with partners. 
Absorptive capacity, our second moderator, had a positive effect on the relationship 
between viability and governance leading to in-house commercialization, and a negative 
effect on  selling the innovation or licensing or developing with partners. At this point, 
the meso-level analysis was deviated from and included both micro and macro factors. 
The previous experience of managers in bringing innovations to market was our third 
moderator—a micro factor.  Prospect theory was used to argue that if firm performance 
is above target, the probability of hierarchy is reduced in favor of partnering or selling, 
particularly if those forms of governance have been used successfully in the past. If 
firm performance is below target, then the probability of selling was reduced in favor 
of partnering or hierarchy, and the probability of partnering was reduced in favor of 
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hierarchy. The final moderators were at the macro level: environmental dynamism, 
munificence, and complexity. They have mixed effects on the relationship between 
viability and governance. Dynamism and complexity had a negative effect on the 
relationship between viability and governance leading to hierarchy and a positive effect 
on the on selling the innovation or licensing or developing with partners. Munificence, 
however, had a positive effect on the likelihood of a firm using hierarchy, and a negative 
effect on the use of licensing or developing with partners.
 This work has made contributions to both theory and practice. For research, the 
framework recognized that successful commercialization is a process that has distinct 
stages and is as dependent on moderators to the process as it is on the direct effects. The 
paper offered insights into idea generation—interactions between source and type—
that need exploring in more detail to determine under what conditions the output from 
those interactions is maximized, both in terms of quantity and quality. It also introduced 
the concept of viability assessment into the process of commercialization—something 
that is most notable by its absence from the theoretical literature on innovation 
management. A direct link between governance and success was also made, recognizing 
that not all innovations have to be developed in-house or with partners—they also can 
be sold, an outcome that is still commercialization. Addressing these questions should 
further our understanding in terms of what forms of governance should maximize 
returns from innovation. This work recognized that successful commercialization is 
a complex, multi-level process that requires input from extant theories as diverse as 
those explaining governance, networks, absorptive capacity, managerial behavior, and 
environmental factors. It opens up the potential for extending empirical research on 
commercialization. Additionally, the assumptions on which the model is based need 
to be empirically tested for validity. Before these or any other lessons can be acted 
upon with confidence, much research remains to be done. Surveys or secondary data 
sets can be used to conduct positivist research in order to test the propositions, while 
detailed case studies of firms in specific industries under given circumstances may aid 
in attaining an interpretivist understanding of commercialization of innovation that is 
deeper, richer, and more detailed. 
 In terms of practice, the baseline model revealed an interaction between internal 
and external sources of ideas for innovation, and whether or not they were deliberate 
or emergent. To be effective, those interactions need managing. Second, a careful 
assessment of the profit potential, vis-à-vis the firm’s capabilities, helped force a 
separation between commitment to the newly developed technology and the ability 
to make money from it. Third, the model highlights the need for a firm to consider 
its network of partners and their capabilities before plunging into a decision. This 
permits risk reduction, it prevents a firm from disposing of a technology that could 
be developed with partners, it allows the firm to find better capabilities than those 
it possesses, and it allows the firm to hand-off development and commercialization, 
which then frees up time and resources for bringing other innovations to market. 
Fourth, it showed that firms need to question the effects of previous experiences on 
commercialization of innovations. For instance, if managers have been successful with 
such actions in the past, their assessment of the probability of failure will be artificially 
low. Lastly, an understanding of the macro-level environmental factors of dynamism, 
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munificence, and complexity is crucial in determining whether an innovation is best 
kept in-house, developed with partners, or simply disposed of. 
 All projects have certain inherent limitations. In this work, it was implicitly held 
constant the impact of networks within the firm as a potential moderator between 
viability and governance. Further, the paper did not discuss how the variables in the 
baseline model and the four moderators interact with each other. In determining the 
effects of each moderator, we implicitly held the other constructs constant. Future 
research extensions could be made on understanding the impact of these moderators, 
and internal networks, as a gestalt. Within that gestalt there also will be a feedback 
loop from commercialization to idea generation within innovation sourcing, an issue 
that was intentionally left beyond the scope of our discussions.
 Some firms are good at innovation, but the fact remains that firms live and die 
by their ability to successfully bring innovations to market. This work has provided a 
theoretical model to address the question of what drives success in that process. While 
the thinking in this work is of relevance to practice, we have generated a model that 
should act as a catalyst for scholars to extend existing research on the commercialization 
process, and thus create an even deeper understanding of this crucial business activity. 
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